Wednesday Linktacular

During his recap of last night's game, Hank Waddles of Bronx Banter really did justice to Colin Curtis' first Major League hit, something that we only mentioned in passing because of its limited significance to the game. Money quote:

There are a lot of reasons why I love baseball, but moments like these are high on the list. Basketball players don’t care much about their first basket, and I’m guessing that even quarterbacks forget their first touchdowns, but there seems to be something magical about a player’s first hit. Every once in a while, like Tuesday night in Arizona, we get to share in that moment.

Chad Jennings has more, including some audio from Curtis.

We also neglected to mention Joba Chamberlain's stellar inning last night but Mike from River Ave. Blues picks up that slack. We've seen these standout, stand-alone innings from Joba a few times this year and the hopeful reactions to them but remember that he was pitching with a seven run lead, in unusually warm weather against a team that's prone to striking out. A good inning is a good inning, but Joba has to rip off a bunch of them in a row before we have a legitimate reason to get excited.

Katie Sharp at ESPN's "TMI" Blog (still hate that name) looks a little deeper into Robinson Cano's improvements this year (subs. req'd), confirming what you probably have noticed about his approach at the plate:

One key change for Cano is that he’s finally learned to be patient and swing at more hittable pitches. Last year, he swung at 54% of all pitches and chased 35% of pitches out the zone with runners in scoring position – both of which were well above the major league averages of 46% and 24%, respectively. This year, he’s lowered his overall swing rate to 47.1% and his chase percentage has fallen to 29.1%.

Pending Pinstripes asks whether or not the Yanks should DFA Chan Ho Park. Judging by Joe Girardi's comments, it looks like the Yanks are going to stick with him for the time being. I certainly don't feel comfortable when he enters the game in a high leverage situations but his ability to throw multiple innings means he can still be useful on the roster.

The Yankees are playing better against bad teams than good ones? You've gotta be shitting me!

I don't have anything to link to just yet, but how about that USA soccer victory?!!

A Mickey Mouse sculpture adorned with Red Sox logos prepared for the All-Star Game was vandalized out in LA. Some may assume it was a group of Yankee fans who did it, but my money is on the Crips. Those folks don't take to kindly to people who wear red and display body language which seems to pose the question "What, bitch?"

The Sports Hernia inarguably has the greatest headlines.

Dave Cameron of FanGraphs argues that the only way to shorten the length of the games is to enlarge the strikezone. That or trim down the commercial breaks, but we all know that's not going to happen.

Over at U.S.S. Mariner, Cameron checks on with Lou Pinella's record seven years after he was traded to Tampa Bay along with Antonio Perez for Randy Winn, and hits on what I think is a fundamental truth in baseball:

The fact of the matter is that Piniella, like pretty much every other manager on earth, wins with teams that have talent and loses with teams that don’t. He doesn’t get more out of his players than anyone else. He doesn’t inspire his men to greatness. He doesn’t make brilliant tactical decisions or teach bad players how to become good ones. Right now, in fact, he’s making a debacle of the Cubs catching situation by benching Geovany Soto (who is really good) in favor of Koyie Hill (who is really bad).

Here's a cool interview with the founder of Baseball-Reference, Sean Foreman. It's on the Bleacher Report, but don't worry, it's not stolen from somewhere else or ridden with grammatical errors.

A site called Snippets used Google Maps to look at every baseball field in the MLB. They came up with some interesting facts that you may or may not be aware of and created some sweet graphics. It's a bit like the one Craig Robinson did for his site (Flip Flop Fly Ball) but with way more words.

Speaking of Mr. Robinson, the fine gentlemen of Pitchers & Poets did an excellent podcast with him a while back that I've been meaning to link to. For those familiar with Craig's work, you'll be unsurprised to find that he's an illustrator by trade. The interview runs about a half hour and I assure that it will hold your attention for that whole time.

Mark Teixeira's mom told the world that he started referring to himself as "Kurt Teixeira" after the lead singer of Nirvana killed himself back in 1994. Yeah, that's kind of embarrassing, but on the bright side, maybe he can pick a song other than Twisted Sister now that the cat's out of the bag.

I don't mean to end on a sad note, but death seems to churn up some decidedly poignant writing. First, J.C. Bradbury wrote about what will likely be the last Father's Day he spent with his dad. And secondly, during Monday night's blowout, from over the loudspeakers in Chase Field, Marc Carig was reminded of his sister, six years after the unthinkable happened. Both of those will choke you up a bit, but are well worth reading.

Why We Overvalue Relievers

Earlier this offseason, Joe DeLessio of New York Magazine did a countdown of the most important Yankee players. His number 1: Mariano Rivera.

Those of you who are sabermatrically-inclined probably just responded with a collective eye-roll. Wins Above Replacement ranked Rivera as only the 5th most valuable pitcher on the Yankees last season, behind CC Sabathia, A.J. Burnett, Andy Pettitte and Phil Hughes. When you include position players, Rivera drops to 15th, just behind Brett Gardner.

How is that possible? Dave Cameron explains:

While the quality of [relievers] work is very high, the quantity is low, which limits their total value. It’s nearly impossible to rack up huge win values while facing less than 300 batters per season. Yes, each of those batters faced are more critical to a win than a regular batter faced, but this is accounted for in WAR.

It's not to say that WAR is a perfect measure - I don't think anyone believes that Brett Gardner is more irreplaceable/valuable than Rivera - but if the numbers are even close, then it's clear that people (media, fans, etc.) tend to overvalue relievers. When you look at these numbers, it becomes clear that some front offices share this skewed view and are willing to overpay them as well.

Why is that? Perhaps a series like the one the Yanks just wrapped up can shed some light.

None of the six pitchers Joe Girardi and Terry Francona called upon to start the last three at Fenway games factored into a decision. Only Sabathia and Lackey were particularly close - both of them watching their lead evaporate under the watch of the man who relieved them. Therefore, each contest was decided by pitchers who entered the game via the bullpen.

Chan Ho Park was on both sides of that equation, taking the loss on Sunday night after allowing a two run homer to Dustin Pedroia and getting the win last night after throwing three scoreless innings while the game was knotted at 1. Jonathan Papelbon had a similar experience, converting a save on Friday and blowing one last night. Each played the role of goat and hero just a few nights apart.

While WAR can objectively weight the contributions of pitchers by leverage, we as fans can't hope to be nearly as unbiased. As a close game progresses, stress and anxiety in the attentive viewer build. Our joy and frustration are multiplied by those factors and relief pitchers are the one major variable in the equation. The lineups are essentially the same but as the stakes within the game increase, the faces on the mound change.

And that's why someone would try to make the case that Mariano Rivera is the most important player on the Yankees. He might not be the most important from a zero sum sabermetric perspective, but he is on a purely observational standpoint, if you have a rooting interest in the team, Mo is the man. CC Sabathia throws far more innings, but they don't seem to have as much on the line. Mark Teixiera plays in almost every game, but most of his contributions occur under ordinary circumstances.

When Rivera enters the game, as a fan, you can exhale. We've seen him do it so many times before, it's hard not to be confident. You trust that he's going to get the job does until he doesn't - and then you assume that he'll do it next time. Conversely, the three innings that Chan Ho park pitched felt significantly more tense and uncertain. The difference between them is in that respect more than commensurate with their respective abilities.

Of course, Mo did what he usually does during the past two nights. He gave up just one baserunner and the go-ahead run never came to the plate. A couple of late nights at the office and two saves in the book.

It might not show up in advanced stats or translate to as many wins above replacement as we would assume, but Rivera and other trustworthy relievers contribute greatly to the enjoyment of rooting for the team. If you spend enough time reading about and understanding the principles of sabermertics, you should realize that his importance is magnified in your mind. But when a save situation rolls around, he really does seems like the most important guy on the team.

Reconsidering Outfield Alignment

In an unsurprising move, Curtis Granderson was officially named the Yankees' center fielder yesterday. Granderson made but one appearance in left field this spring, so there wasn't much question about where he would play.

That wasn't the story for much of the off-season. Once it became apparent that Brett Gardner would be amongst the starting outfielders, speculation ran rampant as to whether the Yankees would be better served with Gardner or Granderson patrolling center.

Through his first two Major League seasons, Brett Gardner has posted an asburd UZR of 16.7 through nearly 800 innings in center field. Granderson is no slouch defensively, with a UZR/150 of 4.9 in CF through four plus seasons, but recent scouting reports have been critical of his jumps and routes, and his UZRs over the past two years have been -8.9 and 1.6.

Initially, I was in favor of playing Gardner in center. However, with just 86 defensive games in center to his credit, he hasn't accumulated enough playing time to inspire full confidence in his impressive numbers. Further, people far smarter than I am explained that the difference between Gardner in left and Granderson in left was virtually infinitesimal.


In light of that, and knowing that it's no sure thing that Brett Gardner spends the entirety of 2010 as a starter, it's probably best to leave Granderson in center. It should keep him more comfortable as he settles into life as a Yankee and it saves him from having to switch positions again should the club choose to add another left fielder later this year (or in 2o11 since so many can't seem to stop talking about acquiring Jayson Werth or Carl Crawford next year even though not a single pitch has been thrown this year).

Going outside the box for a second here though, is the Yankees' outfield defense best off with Gardner in left? Last month, TYU took a closer look at the defensively maligned Nick Swisher, finding that he actually grades out above average from a range point of view, but his overall UZR is hindered by his poor arm rating. Gardner meanwhile, not only covers a lot of ground, but as we examined last year, he also has a plus arm thanks to his accuracy.

With that in mind, might the Yankees be better served to play Swisher in left where his poor arm won't be as much of a detriment and Gardner in right where his arm could be a greater asset?

Probably not. Gardner's defensive is still plagued by small sample size, particularly when it comes to his arm. Range is far more important than arm when it comes to outfield defense. Left field in the new Stadium isn't as expansive as it was in past incarnations, but it's still big for a corner field. Intuitively at least, the Yankees are probably better off with Gardner in left and Swisher in right, even if the numbers might suggest otherwise right now.

Yet Another Joba To The Bullpen Post

Good morning Fackers. As our Spring Training countdown will remind you later on today, it's just twelve more days until pitchers and catchers report. It's been a pretty interesting off-season all things considered, but every year, the flow of transactions and real news invariably slows to a drip. That leaves us prone to rumor and conjecture, and apparently "us" includes "real journalists" as well.

Wednesday, Joel Sherman dipped into the trusty old Joba-to-the-bullpen bag to conjure up a story with a new twist, proposing that the Yankees lean on their on their one through four starters, wave the white flag on the fifth spot, and place both Chamberlain and Hughes in the pen to create a lockdown relief corps.

I was willing to just let it slide for what it was - a baseless hypothetical proposal during the dead days of the off-season - but as with any Joba-to-the-bullpen story it inevitably had legs. Even at that, I was willing to the let the usual arguments - make-up, potential, the eight inning, the succesor to Mo, etc. - play out and let the story die.

But then Dave Pinto put forth an interesting and unorthodox proposal that I thought brought something new to the table: let both pitch out of the bullpen, but utilize them much like pre-LaRussian firemen, pitching multiple innings at a time. Theoretically, not only would it allow both to pitch enough innings in 2010 to leave them well positioned for starting roles in 2011, but it would give the Yankees a highly effective bullpen while allowing them to carry fewer relief pitchers. As a result, they would conceivably be able to have a better bench, whether it be with a third catcher, another utility infielder, a pinch running specialist, etc.

Pinto's proposal intrigued me for a few reasons. Firstly, I like these type of "outside the box" ideas that challenge prevailing roster construction ideas. Secondly, I love any realistic plan that results in an eleven - or even better a ten - man pitching staff. Thirdly, it reminded me of something I proposed two years ago, as to how the Yankees should best deploy Chamberlain for the 2008 season when 40% of the rotation figured to be Hughes and Ian Kennedy and all three had fairly restrictive innings limits.

That said, interesting as Pinto's proposal is, I don't think that 2010 is the time to try it with Chamberlain. The Yankees have handled him very carefully for the past three seasons to have him in the position he is now. He's primed to enter 2010 with no restrictions, capable of being a fully vetted starting pitcher for the entirety of the season. As such, the intrigue and potential fringe benefits of Pinto's proposal aren't enough to punt on the opportunity to just let Joba pitch this year. Yes, he was frustrating to watch for much of last year, but that's typical of any 23 year old pitcher, let alone one who's had Joba's hype and expectations heaped upon him. Let's see what he can do this year before we give up on the Joba starter project.

Hughes, on the other hand, presents a difficult case. Because of the way he was used last year, he will likely have a 2010 innings limit that proves restrictive. It almost assuredly wouldn't permit him to be a starter all season long, and there's no guarantee that there's a rotation spot for him anyway. But, if the Yankees utilize him strictly as a traditional set up man again in 2010, Hughes will be ill-prepared to assume a starting role in 2011. The organization has to find a way to get Hughes an appropriate amount of innings this year, and in his case Pinto's suggestion may have some merit.

In the end, Pinto's proposal won't happen. While I would like an extra position player or two on the bench, Dave Cameron had an excellent look Tuesday as to how filling the fringe of the roster with pitchers rather than position players is probably the better move. Further, in light of the recent extensions signed by Zack Greinke, Josh Johnson, Felix Hernandez, and Justin Verlander, both Rob Abruzzese at Bronx Baseball Daily and Joe Pawlikowski at RAB note the importance of the Yankees developing Chamberlain and Hughes as top flight starters of their own. Pawlikowski further notes that it's unlikely for a contending team like the Yankees to experiment with such a non-traditional technique. And if that's not enough water thrown on the fire, a "high level source" told Baseball Prospectus' Will Carrol there's "no bleeping way" both pitchers wind up in the pen.

Well, that killed two more days of the off-season. Just twelve more until we can move on to real news like who's "in the best shape of his life" and who's been on fire through two dozen at bats against replacement level competition despite years worth of sucking in the Major Leauges. It's not much, but it beats speculating about Joba to the pen or where Damon will land.

*No dead horses were harmed during the writing of this post

Glen Perkins And Undeserved Demotions

Way back in May, when Jay decided to take a little getaway, he blindly handed me to the keys to the blog for the week. The Yankees were about to wrap a four game series against the Twins, having won the first three via walkoff. The series finale was a Monday night affair, one I was to attend. But before I could escape the office and get on the road, I had to author my first game preview.

In keeping with Fack Youk tradition, I had to choose a song to work into the preview. After looking at the pitching match up for the night, I decided to riff on the name of the Twins starting pitcher for the night and went with "Carl Perkins Cadillac" from the very awesome Drive-By Truckers.

Glen Perkins started for the Twins that night, and the Yankees touched him up pretty good. It marked the fifth straight start in which Perkins surrendered at least four earned runs. The next day, Perkins was placed on the DL with an elbow issue. He returned a month later, and continued to struggle through another nine starts and a relief appearance. He was disabled again, and instead of being activated at the end of the month when rosters expanded, the Twins optioned him to AAA, despite the fact the minor league season was essentially over.

Though Perkins struggled in 2009, it was still an unorthodox move, particularly for a club that was in a pennant race. Perkins thought so too, and filed a grievance against the Twins. Being optioned out, rather than kept on the DL, prevented Perkins from accruing Major League service time. Not only did he fail to earn a Big League salary in that time, but the lack of service time prevented him from attaining Super Two arbitration status. That in turn has a major impact upon Perkins' salary for this year and beyond.

Back when I wrote that preview, I noted how cool it must have been for Perkins, born and bred in St. Paul and a former member of the University of Minnesota baseball team, to be drafted by and playing for his hometown team. But as we saw in the 1990 Sports Illustrated article about Dave Righetti that we linked to Friday, sometimes living out a boyhood dream isn't all it's cracked up to be. There's now a rift between Perkins and his club, and there's a chance he won't be a Twin much longer. It appears Perkins won't have quite as happy a story as fellow hometown hero Joe Mauer.

In the bigger picture, Perkins' story is part of an interesting and possibly troubling trend around the game: teams questionably optioning out young, but established players in effort to keep them under club control longer. The Twins took a similar tact with Francisco Liriano in 2008, and the Royals treated Alex Gordon the same way last year. We've seen teams delay calling up prospects like Evan Longoria, David Price, and Matt Wieters in order to keep them from Super Two arbitration status. But in my eyes at least, there's a difference between a club doing that to a minor leaguer on the way up as opposed to doing it to established Major Leaguers like Perkins, Liriano, and Gordon.

The past decade has seen Major League clubs look to exploit market inefficiencies. Valuing young, cost controlled talent has been amongst the leading ways teams have looked to gain an edge. Holding back Longoria, Price, and Wieters and sending down Liriano, Perkins, and Gordon are all part of that process. If Dave Cameron is right and veteran players are the latest market inefficieny, it'll be interesting to see if this trend of demoting established young players continues.

Vazquez Trade Reactions

We posted our initial take on the deal earlier this morning, but here is a collection of what else is being said around these here internets about the acquisition of Javier Vazquez:

Will from IIATMS looks at what this might mean for the Yankees' defense. Aaron Gleeman from Circling the Bases asks a similar question.

Ben from River Ave. Blues revisits Vazquez's last time in the Bronx.

Craig Calcaterra correctly guessed that it was Vazquez this morning, posted a quick reaction to the deal and as a Braves fan, explained why the deal wasn't so bad.

Joel Sherman was the first to name Vazquez as the target this morning and has an in-depth breakdown of the trade. He also explained that the Yankees valued a starting pitcher over a left fielder and are still looking to keep their payroll under $200M, meaning LF will likely be filled on the cheap. They are also planning to deal either Chad Gaudin or Sergio Mitre before spring training.

There are over 200 comments on the BBTF trade dedicated to the trade as well.

And some quick quotes, taken completely out of context:

Dave Cameron, FanGraphs: "The reaction to this deal on Twitter has not been kind to Atlanta, with most people concluding that the Yankees got Vazquez for peanuts. I’m not so sure."

Joe Posnanski: Sigh. The Yankees traded for Vazquez to be their NUMBER FOUR starter. And the Royals signed Jason Kendall to be their starting catcher.

Keith Law: "At this point, the Yankees now have a rotation close to that of the Red Sox, and they could very well enter 2010 a better team on paper than they were at the same time before 2009.

Peter Abraham, Boston Globe: "You knew this was coming. Once the Red Sox signed John Lackey, there was no way the Yankees would go into next season with a rotation of CC Sabathia, A.J. Burnett, Andy Pettitte and two question marks."

Jonah Keri, via Twitter: "To be fair to the #Braves, any time you can acquire dryer lint for one of the best SP in baseball, you gotta do it.

Tyler Kepner, via Twitter: "Yanks use 6 prospects to get Granderson and Vazquez, yet keep Hughes, Joba, Montero, Melancon, Romine, McAllister. Not bad."

Ben Kabak, River Ave. Blues: "As much as it strengthens the team’s rotation, it also weakens their outfield. The leftfield situation currently looks like a Brett Gardner/Jamie Hoffmann platoon, which doesn’t exactly inspire confidence."

Rob Iracane, Walkoff Walk: "Let it be known that this guy (points to self) would rather have dismissed Nick Swisher, who cannot field his position, run the bases, or dress like a grown-up. But hey, Vazquez strikes out batters like it's his job (note: it is his job) so as a Yankees fan, I am pleased."

Satchel Price, Beyond the Box Score: "Considering what the Phillies landed for one year of Cliff Lee, arguably a superior pitcher, at a cheaper salary, I think that Atlanta got a pretty solid return for Vazquez, even if it doesn't include the impact bat that Atlanta sorely needs."

Kevin Kaduk, Big League Stew: "It's often been said that Vazquez is a pitcher that throws best when the expectations are low and his stats do back that up. "

Josh, Jorge Says No!: "Make no mistake about it though, if Vazquez can give the Yankees 200 IP with 190+ K's, and a 3.75 ERA, then there is no reason why he won't be able to win 15+ games with the Yankees the way this team is constructed."

All Granderson, All The Time

Good morning Fackers. My gut reaction to the Curtis Granderson trade was indifference. Or confusion maybe. As best as I can describe, I don't think it's a bad trade, I'm just not sure it was a necessary trade. Perhaps this stems from some bias on my part, as from the start, I thought the Granderson-to-the-Yankees rumors were just unfounded rumors.

People far smarter than me (Keith Law, Rob Neyer, Dave Cameron, etc.) have labeled this a steal of a deal for the Yankees. I can understand that point of view and I can't come up with a solid counterargument against it. But my knee jerk reaction is that the Yankees had an average to just-above average centerfield platoon in 2009. Curtis Granderson is without a doubt an improvement upon that platoon, but outside of his outstanding 2007, he's been just very good rather than excellent over the past four years. I suppose that's still worth the price paid since Austin Jackson's ceiling is apparently to become Curtis Granderson, but it stings a bit to lose three guys that we've followed through the system over the past several years. I suppose any good trade has a price to pay, and the fact that I don't want to give up the likes of AJax, IPK, and Coke but that I'm not heartbroken over it means that it was a decent trade.

That said, the more I think about the deal, the more questions I come up with. In no specific order here are some thoughts and questions, some of which probably echo the multitude of thoughts already expressed on this deal:

• Where does Granderson play? At present the Yankees don't have a left fielder, but as above, they have a decent CF platoon. Does Granderson play left? A lot of Granderson's value comes from his ability to produce as he can as a centerfielder.


• Related to that, where does this leave Johnny Damon and Hideki Matsui? There's virtually no chance they both return now, if not because of roster spots then certainly because of payroll. Does either return?


• Granderson can't hit lefties. Gardner's a lefty, Melky's a switch hitter who can't really hit lefties either. Granderson likely needs a platoon partner. Does this mean Reed Johnson, as suggested by Keith Law and a host of others? If so, does that not leave room for Melky or Gardner? Or do we ignore Granderson's numbers against lefties and chalk it up to insufficient sample size, or assume that he can turn it around like Paul O'Neill before him?


• Brian Cashman was quoted this week as saying the Yankees priorities are "pitching, pitching, pitching and then leftfield". I assumed that to mean they were going to acquire pitching, or at least firm up pitching. Well, they have a left fielder, potentially, but all they've done so far is subtract pitching. Don't get me wrong, no one is going to cry over Brian Bruney, Ian Kennedy, and Phil Coke. But in them you have three guys who have proven themselves capable of pitching at the Major League level in various capacities. Now all three are gone without another pitcher to show for it. It may not have a major impact on the overall talent level, but does impact the depth.


• So much for keeping payroll down, or even reducing it. Granderson has a manageable deal for the next three to four years, but he's guaranteed $23.75M over the next three years, including $5.5M this year, with a $13M option or $2M buyout for 2013. Again, manageable, but more than what the Yankees would have been playing for the likely CF alternatives during that time.


• The Granderson deal should all but prevent the Yankees from dealing for Roy Halladay. All Halladay rumors started with Joba or Hughes combined with AJax or Montero. While 3 of those 4 guys are still available, making such a trade would leave the Yankees nearly completely devoid of young talent at the Big League level and the top levels of the farm system. Losing AJax and IPK may not be the worse thing in the world, but I think it does make it more important to keep the likes of Hughes, Chamberlain, and Montero.


• The Yankees have lost two relief pitchers over the last two days. Again, no big loss. But, Damaso Marte has been consistently inconsistent in the last two years and may be in the mix to be "The Eighth Inning Guy (TM)". Joe Girardi loves to match up. With Coke gone, I have to figure that barring a trade, Mike Dunn will be in the Yankee pen next year. In fact, given that the Yankees insisted he be pulled from the initially proposed deal, I imagine they have plans for him. Dunn's K rates are very appealing, but his BB rates scare me. A lot. He may be left handed Bruney. in fact he may make Bruney look like Greg Maddux by comparison.


• Granderson appears to be another high character acquisition for the Yankees. Obviously his talent is what precipitated the deal, but given the number of talented "character guys" the Yankees have brought in over the past year following years of malcontents, I can't help but wonder if the organization is targeting players who contribute both on the field and in the clubhouse.

Anyway, those were the first things that came to mind. This one's been dissected a thousand different ways throughout the Yankee blogosphere already. I'm sure we'll have more to say over the next several days.

What's Being Said About The Granderson Trade

Since the trade is seemingly official, it's time to round up some reactions for the deal that saw the Yankees give up Austin Jackson, Ian Kennedy and Phil Coke, the Diamondbacks surrender Max Scherzer and Daniel Schlereth and the Tigers deal Edwin Jackson and Curtis Granderson. MLBTR weighs in with the salary implications and when the dust settles, here's where they all end up:

• Yankees get Granderson
• Diamondbacks get Edwin Jackson and Ian Kennedy
• Tigers get Austin Jackson, Max Scherzer, Phil Coke and Daniel Schlereth

It's sad to see Austin Jackson go but I don't think we are going to miss Ian Kennedy or Phil Coke all that much. Kennedy was not likely to start for the Yanks anytime soon and Coke - although he was solid for long stretches - was victimized by his high HR rate.

Granderson is not without his flaws, namely abysmal production against LHP, but he's relatively inexpensive for a player of his caliber. I would personally love to see Granderson play LF in the Bronx. Teams like the Rays and Mariners have stashed players capable of playing CF at corner OF positions (Carl Crawford, Ichiro) and seen good results, but most of the talk has assumed Granderson will be playing CF. For what it's worth, UZR hasn't thought very highly of his defense in CF over the past two years and the Yankees have a serviceable duo in CF already. Should Granderson want to take over that slot, it may require further maneuvering.

Now for some other reactions...

Dave Cameron absolutely loves the deal for the Yankees:

From the Yankees perspective, this deal is almost too good to be true. Heading into his age 29 season, Granderson is a legitimate +4 win center fielder signed to a bargain contract for the next four years. I ranked him as the 22nd most valuable asset in terms of trade value in baseball over the summer, and the Yankees are getting him for a variety pack of role players. He instantly makes their team better, giving them a legitimate all-star center fielder who should thrive in Yankee Stadium. For as much as the Yankees have a payroll advantage, they continue to win because Brian Cashman targets the right players. Granderson is a fantastic acquisition for them.

Matthew Pouliot from Circling the Bases agrees that they made out well.

Granderson's defense has slipped a bit and it looks like he'll always be a liability against lefties, but he still brings quite a bit to the table and he should put up some big numbers in center field for the Yankees. His contract is also manageable, as he's due $5.5 million next year, $8.25 million in 2011, $10 million in 2012 and then $13 million or a $2 million buyout in 2013.

Perhaps the Yankees should have just signed Mike Cameron instead, but the price for Granderson was right. Austin Jackson was the only piece they gave up likely to play a big role going forward.

Joel Sherman analyzes the loss of Austin Jackson:

The tough player for the Yankees to lose in this swap was Austin Jackson. In recent years, the Yankees have protected Jackson when, for example, the Nationals asked for him in July 2006 for Alfonso Soriano and Seattle asked for him last July for Jarrod Washburn.

But the reality is, if Jackson maximizes his talent, he probably would be just a cost-efficient version of Granderson.

Greg Fertel at Pending Pinstripes thinks a rebound is likely for Granderson:

Curtis Granderson had somewhat of a down year in 2009, posting a wOBA of .340 compared to his career mark of .358, but he plays a good center field and should be able to rebound. The short porch in left field should allow him to improve his power numbers and a rebound on batted balls in play should make his overall hitting like look quite a bit better.

In 2009, he hit only .276 on balls in play. Due to his speed, he has been able to maintain an above average mark of .323 for his career. Even though he hit markedly more fly balls in '09, it is unlikely that he posts a BABIP as low as .276 in the upcoming seasons.

More on this later, obviously.

WHIP, FIP & The WAR Against Wins

Good morning, Fackers. In the wake of the senior circuit Cy Young, like the AL version, being awarded to a pitcher not on the basis of his won-lost record but on the quality and number of his innings pitched, we're again going to disagree with the well-respected Tyler Kepner.

As Matt pointed out on Wednesday, Kepner noted that Zack Greinke acknowledged FIP in his post-award conference call but was grasping at straws in an attempt to frame the knowledge of advanced statistics as a key component in Greinke's success. Last night, Kepner tried to connect what was said by Greinke (or more accurately, Brian Bannister) with Tim Lincecum's explanation of his approach and made the same conflation:

Obviously, there is no substitute for pure talent. But in Greinke, Bannister’s teammate, we are seeing what can happen when off-the-charts talent meets sophisticated understanding of numbers.

The same is true of Lincecum, to a degree. His stuff is filthy, but he said he was mainly concerned with how many walks-plus-hits he allows per inning – which was curious, in a way, because Dan Haren, Chris Carpenter and Javier Vazquez all had a better WHIP than Lincecum in the N.L. this season.

First, Lincecum's WHIP was a minuscule 1.05. Haren, Carpenter, and Vasquez? 1.00, 1.01, 1.03. That's a difference of one batter for every 20, 25 and 50 innings, respectively, which Lincecum easily erases with his superior strikeout ratio.

But more importantly, what if Lincecum had simply said that he was trying his best not to allow batters to reach base? It would have been dismissed as a typical cliche. On the offensive side of the ball, we frequently hear batters saying that they were "just trying to get on base" which is just a different way of saying that they were trying to improve their on base percentage.

In most cases, the goals in baseball are pretty obvious. If you are a batter, don't use up outs. If you are a pitcher, try to keep men off the basepaths, preferably via strikeout. There is still some wiggle room regarding the value of sacrifice hits and bunting, but there isn't a whole lot advanced statistics can teach players. Knowing about UZR isn't going to make someone a better defender. They already know they should be trying to field as many balls, as far away from them as possible.

The main function of the more advanced metrics that are steadily gaining in popularity such as WAR, wOBA, VORP, WPA, RE24, UZR, and FRAA is that they allow observers to more accurately compare players to one another. While players citing FIP and WHIP can only increase their popularity, which is certainly a positive thing, understanding them doesn't provide much in terms of strategical, on-field edge.

The real story emerging from the 2009 Cy Young voting is that the voters have begun to value better statistics and in turn, more objective analysis. Which is to say, they're not blindly picking the pitcher who had the most wins.

Kepner demonstrates this by comparing this year's voting to win-skewed results 1990 and 1998 (both of which illustrate the writer's old reliance on wins), but Dave Cameron over at FanGraphs sums it up best:

Congratulations to the members of the BBWAA, who have been willing to adapt as the game changes. They deserve recognition for being willing to accept the shift towards better analytical methods. And getting away from wins as a measure of the value of a pitcher is a big first step.

Of course, Adam Wainwright who left his last game of the season with a 6-1 lead in line for his 20th win still received the most first place votes in the NL. He only finished 10 points behind Lincecum, so maybe if his bullpen had held up, the aftermath of these awards would be slightly less celebratory.

Both Matt and I have taken turns raining on this parade, but I think it's likely that in hindsight, 2009 will be cited as the year that Advanced Stats won the war against Conventional Wisdom. However, I'm more inclined to think that this was the Battle of Saratoga. And considering Bill James penned the hardball version of the Declaration of Independence over 30 years ago, it's probably going to a while before we see any sort of Treaty of Paris.

Quotes From Last Night: Game 2 Edition

Presented without comment. Please react in the comments as you see fit:

Jerry Davis (in reference to Brian Gorman's call on Ryan Howard's play in the 7th): "The objective is to get it right, we asked each other what we had seen and the replay confirmed we got it right"

Ryan Howard: “Did I catch it? Well, they called him out. [winks]”

Dave Cameron: The first two Jeter bunt attempts will be criticized by members of the statistical community as part of the reflexive don’t-bunt-ever strategy that has gained too much popularity, but they were the right play. The two-strike bunt attempt really was a bad idea (the additional cost of a foul turning into an out reduces the odds enough to make swinging away more likely to produce a single run, which was the original goal), but the first two stabs at it, Jeter was making the right play.

Jimmy Rollins (via The Fightins): "I was expecting some of that [Philadelphia rowdiness] here, but it was very tame and civilized, really. "You only had one big cheer, and that was on home runs."

Rollins was asked if this feels "more like a World Series" than last year's Series with Tampa Bay.

"When we get to Philly, it will," he said. Because the atmosphere will be so different? "Exactly."

Ken Rosenthal: Is it too late to reopen the old Yankee Stadium one more time?

Pedro Martinez was in the house Thursday night — Pedro Martinez, the old Boston devil. The crowd of 50,181 mustered a few spontaneous, "Who's your daddy?" chants. But more often than not, the fans needed a prompt from the stadium organ to get going.

Bob Raissman: Wonder how they felt about Fox's Tim McCarver and Joe Buck basically saying the joint had all the audio ambiance of a morgue. The voices were not talking about the building's acoustics. During Game 2 of World Series Thursday night, they were talking about Yankee fans (at least the ones who can still afford a ticket) who checked their mouths at the door.

John Gonzalez, Philly Inquirer: Scariest looking guy in the entire park, though, was A.J. Burnett. When did he remember how to pitch?

I got a text from my buddy Fearce before the eighth inning that pretty much summed up what I was thinking: "I don't know what to do when I can't really complain about bad calls or the announcers hating Philly. Feels weird."

Charlie Manuel: "We can hit Rivera. We've proved that. He's good. He's one of the best closers in baseball, if not the best. He's very good. But I've seen our team handle good pitching, and we're definitely capable of scoring runs late in the game."

Pedro Martinez (via The 700 Level): "I didn't feel strong. I've been under the weather the last couple of days. That's not an excuse. I felt good enough to make pitches and that's what I told them and they trusted me. But I was going to take this start. When I chose this team it was to pitch in the World Series. I'm extremely happy to have had the opportunity."

Don't Kill The Manager

Morning Fackers. Last night sucked. There's no way around it. But what sucks even more is that we are going to have to listen to people second guess every managerial move made last night for two days before Game 6.

I'm not going to name names, but there were a lot of people on Twitter last night who couldn't possibly understand why Mike Scioscia took John Lackey out with 104 pitches with the bases loaded in the top of the 7th (you know, after the Yanks scored all their runs). Interestingly, they were also conveniently outraged that Joe Girardi let A.J. Burnett come out for the 7th inning with 80 pitches (but only after Burnett allowed two men to reach base, of course). And what was pretty much the only thing that those two moves had in common? Neither worked out.

I'm sure they weren't just on Twitter. These Monday morning quarterbacks were probably in the bars and living rooms where you guys were watching the game as well. These people know who they are. Actually, they probably don't because they only deal in hindsight and therefore always agree with the decisions that work out and can't possibly believe what the manager was thinking when one goes wrong.

First, the Lackey move. Don't forget that two batters before he was pulled, Lackey showed up home plate umpire Fieldin Culbreth by waving his arms and yelling at him after a called ball four. He then walked Derek Jeter on 4 pitches and left a ball fat and over the plate that Johnny Damon luckily didn't do much with. Lackey had lost his composure and lost his strike zone and I doubt Culbreth was dying to give him any close pitches. While it was a debatable decision, I can see why Scioscia went to his bullpen. Whether it should have been Darren Oliver is another issue.

As for Burnett, he had given up all four of his runs in the first inning before he even recorded an out. Therefore, he had just pitched 6 consecutive scoreless innings leading up to that point and needed only 68 pitches to do so. What would you have thought about leaving him in if he hadn't allowed those runs in the first? Because what happened in that inning was not nearly as relevant as how he had been throwing the ball since then.

Sure, Girardi could have gone to the bullpen, but the people who are smugly second guessing that decision are the same ones who have been crying about "overmanaging" throughout this postseason mostly because it's become the in vogue thing to say.

Perhaps Girardi could have pulled Burnett after the lead-off single to Mathis. But the only right handed reliever who was ready at that point was Joba, and I think we can agree that he didn't have his best stuff last night. Perhaps he should have had Hughes warming up, but the same thing applies to him. So Burnett gave up the single to Mathis. Is it Girardi's fault that the Angels' back up cather has decided to turn into Josh Gibson during this series? He's literally a career .200 hitter - on the nose.

Does anyone remember how the Yankees got the two outs in that inning? It was Damaso Marte, who Girardi chose over Phil Coke to face Chone Figgins and Bobby Abreu, but I don't hear anyone acknowledging the fact that decision worked out well for him.

The reality is that no matter how the Yankees blew the lead - if Girardi had brought in Joba, Hughes, Robertson, Coke, Aceves, Marte or Rivera in any order - he would be taking shit for it this morning. For instance, if he brought in Hughes and he coughed up the lead, people would be exasperated that Girardi had pulled Burnett after only 80 pitches. Ergo, at a certain point, the blame goes to the players.

Although the offense scored 6 runs, they were useless for 8 innings. The black hole in the bottom of the line-up known as "Nick Swisher" made the Yankees 32.3% less likely to win this game with his offensive contributions (or lack thereof). Johnny Damon wasn't helping either (-11.9%).

Phil Hughes needed to get one out in the 7th inning and the Yankees would have held onto the lead. One out and no one would have been talking about Girardi's bullpen management this morning.

Instead, Hughes issued a pass to Torii Hunter that I'm sure anyone reading this blog could have worked since none of the four balls even sniffed the strike zone. Next, he had Vlad Guerrero right where he wanted him - in a 1-2 count after an ugly swing and miss. Jorge Posada called for a pitch up in the zone, momentarily standing up from his crouch to indicate it, but Hughes served a belt-high meatball along with some spaghetti, Bolognese sauce, grated Pecorino Romano and some delicious garlic bread. He's lucky Vlad is half the man he used to be or else that would have probably been a grand slam instead of a bobbling single up the middle.

The least defensible move that Girardi made, which hardly anyone is talking about because it didn't end up mattering, was the decision to pinch run for A-Rod in the 9th inning. The game almost equally likely to be tied up at that point with A-Rod or Guzman running the bases, as Dave Cameron from FanGraphs demonstrated. Cameron estimates that the marginal gain of putting in Guzman is something like 1%. Girardi traded that in for having his best hitter (and a solid defender) on the bench in extra innings should the Yankees have tied the game. Imagine the uproar if A-Rod's line up slot had come up again.

I understand that Girardi has made his bed by executing a ton of agressive moves this postseason, most of which have worked out but some of which have not. He's exerted too much control over the games too many times, so now people are all too willing to critique every move he makes. He's made the game too much about himself as opposed to the players which is why people are so open with their complaints. But save your breath. As Cameron said in the linked post above, we're tilting at windmills. You can assign blame 'til you're blue in the face, but it's not going to put the Yankees in the World Series. They're going to have to do that themselves sometime this weekend.

Partial Postseason Prognostication

With only a week remaining in the MLB regular season and only two races still undecided - the AL Central and NL Wild Card - we're seeing more and more articles seeking historical trends that predict postseason success. Last week, we linked to Lisa Swan's article about strong Septembers and Flip Flop Fly Ball's chart displaying the correlation (or lack thereof) between the having the best record during the regular season and winning the World Series.

Well late last week and over the weekend a few more of these pieces popped up and here are three of them (all via BBTF):

Similar to the chart at FFFB, Tom Verducci sorted the last 9 World Series winners by their regular season record and found an almost perfectly even distribution of League Championship pennants and World Series Victories. One championship came from each of the top 7 seeds and two came from teams seeded 8 or higher, such as the 2006 Cardinals who had the 13th best record in the league that year but still won the WS.

It's a pretty rough measure for a couple of reasons. The first, which Verducci points out himself, is that the teams don't play balanced schedules so teams get as much credit for the record in the NL Central as they do in the AL East, and so forth. Secondly, in 2006 for instance, four of the best 5 records came out of the American League. As a result there was an artificially higher chance of a low seed winning a pennant and a World Series (which happened with the Cardinals) since three of them were on one side of the bracket.

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Next up, Dave Cameron wrote a piece for Wall Street Journal's website which showed that over the last 7 years, the teams that won the World Series have had a relatively small amount of meaningless games leading up to the postseason.

Dave quantifies "meaningless" games as ones that were played after their team has locked up a postseason berth either by winning their division or securing the Wild Card, but doesn't count ones that factor in the race for homefield advantage or are played against potential postseason opponents. Those certainly are played with a higher level of effort and urgency that the ones the Yankees are about to play against the Royals, one would assume. As Rob Neyer points out, 7 years is also a pretty small sample size.

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Lastly, we have a piece by Lincoln Mitchell in The Faster Times which would seem to fly directly in the face of the half-baked theory proposed by Jeff Pearlman that we took issue with last week. Mitchell attempts to identify the team with the best two starters each year and concludes that since 1995, that club has won the World Series only twice.

There are problems with this methodology as well. ERA+ is not a bad measure but it certainly is not conclusive in determining the team with the best two starters when the postseason rolled around. Furthermore, if we wanted to do more of a complete assessment, we would rank each team's top two pitchers, or better yet give them a score on a scale of, say, 1-10 which would more accurately display the difference between each duo. In some years the top two hurlers for the best team might get a "9" and the next best team only receives a 6, but a straight ranking wouldn't convey that. Once the scores were determined then we could look at the results and see how they correlated with postseason success. Then we might have a better picture of how having two dominant starters predicts playoff series victories.

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Do you notice a theme developing here? These methodologies are all pretty incomplete. A huge part of the problem is that baseball is littered with variables, there is no control group and you can't just create situations and run them over and over. Of course it's much easier to point out the deficiencies of these findings than take the time to complete the analysis.

All of these writers are admittedly taking a "quick and dirty" type of approach to their analysis and that's completely understandable. At one point, I started a post that was similar to Lisa Swan's about finishing the regular season on a high note (but I wanted to look over the last 10, 15 and 20 games as opposed to the final month) but as soon as I figured out how many tedious calculations I was going to have to do and how much time it would take me to do even a couple years worth of analysis, I scrapped it.

Another factor that makes it difficult to go more in-depth is that, ideally, you want to have a point when you are done with your research. These pieces were written for online outlets where time is always of the essence. You don't want to spend a bunch of time and at the end of the post have to say, "Through all of this research I determined that there is no noticeable correlation in the data."

And this brings me back to a piece that we looked at back at the end of August by Jay Jaffe of Baseball Prospectus. Jaffe brought up the research conducted by Nate Silver and Dayn Perry that lead to the creation of BP's Secret Sauce and applied it to this year's playoff picture. The difference here is that the Silver and Perry went into their research testing all sorts of variables and determined that strong defense, a pitching staff with a high K/9 and strong closer all had high correlation to postseason success. The Secret Sauce is the closest thing we have to a scientific study of what teams are "built for the playoffs" and it's still fairly incomplete.

In all likelihood the Yankees will take the long ALDS, so we still have over nine days before the first postseason pitch is thrown. We're to see more attempts at unlocking the postseason code and they'll probably be pretty interesting. But I highly doubt any of them are going to take the time to shift our thinking with a truly in-depth study of what October baseball really comes down to. Let's just try to enjoy the fact that the Yanks can coast home, throw out their B and C line ups and take things as they come.

How Does Your Gardner Throw?

As Jay pointed out, by way of Ken Singleton, in Wednesday's recap, Brett Gardner is quietly putting together quite a season for himself. Gardner currently leads AL rookies in AVG, OBP, runs, SB, and BB. He's second in RBI and OPS and third in hits. It's an admittedly weak crop of rookie hitters, and Matt Wieters has not been up the whole year nor has he gotten hot yet. I'm not suggesting anyone start a Rookie of the Year campaign for Garner, but he certainly has been a pleasant surprise, particularly after his slow start.

Yet he's not even starting regularly. After getting five hits in the Friday night game against the Mets two weeks ago, Joe Girardi said Gardner had earned regular playing time, something we had advocated for weeks prior. Yet in the twelve games since then, Gardner has started just eight, and five of those came with Melky Cabrera also in the lineup.

Wednesday, Dave Cameron at Fangraphs had an interesting article on the defensive value of Brett Gardner. Sabremetric defensive evaluations have evolved markedly over the past couple years, but I'm not completely sold on them yet (side note, check this interesting Times article via Bronx Banter). That said, UZR/150 appears to be the most evolved at this stage, and Gardner is off the charts according to that metric.

Anyway, give the Fangraphs article a read. Gardner has uncorked a few memorably bad throws this year, but I can also recall a few good ones. Memories aside, the metrics say he's been more good than bad, much more good in fact. While Melky assuredly has a stronger arm, the Fangraphs piece seems to indicate that Gardner has a more effective arm, and a much better all around defensive game.